2 But Feige is correct that the jury in Stewart's case effectively "criminalized radical lawyering" 3 (or, at least, a type of radical lawyering)-an argument that has become more salient when one considers that Stewart was resentenced in July 2010
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Too, COUNTERPUNCH (Oct. 12, 2002) , http://www.counterpunch.org/cassel1012.html (claiming that Stewart's case "sends a clear warning to attorneys: Don't represent accused terrorists, or you could be our next suspect," and surmising that it may "make conscientious lawyers worry that they will not be able to do their job properly with such clients. A lawyer may wonder if she can be zealous when torn between avoiding her own prosecution and representing his client."); Elaine Cassel, The Lynne Stewart Guilty Verdict: Stretching the Definition of " Terrorism" to Its Limits, FINDLAW (Feb. 14, 2005) , http://writ.news.findlaw.com/cassel/20050214.html ("Defense attorneys who represent alleged terrorists-or even detainees who are merely suspected of some connection to terrorism-now know that the government may listen in on their attorney-client communications. They also know that this eavesdropping may give rise to evidence that may be used in their own prosecution for terrorism if they cross the imaginary line drawn by the government."); Nat Hentoff, High Noon for Ashcroft, Stewart, and the Defense Bar, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 16, 2002, http://www.villagevoice.com/ 2002-04-16 /news/high-noon-for-ashcroft-stewart-and-the-defense-bar/ (stating that Stewart's indictment will " 'create a huge, chilling effect-indeed, a glacial effect-on attorneys approached by highly controversial clients to represent them' " (quoting Jonathan Turley)); Sheilah Kast & Mimi Wesson, Jailed Cleric's Lawyer Guilty (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 13, 2005) , available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyId=4497372 (" ' [M] any in the criminal defense community expressed the fear that [the prosecution] was intended as an effort to chill the efforts of zealous defense attorneys . . . [A] lthough some are still characterizing it as a persecution of a devoted attorney, others are willing to see it as a warning only that attorneys who represent defendants accused of terroristic crimes should be careful to observe the limits of their professional role' " (quoting Mimi Wesson)); Robert Smith, Lawyer Found Guilty in Aiding Terrorist Client (NPR radio broadcast Feb. 11, 2005) , available at http://npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4494792 (describing Stewart's fear that her case has had a "chilling effect on defense lawyers around the country"); cf. Anthony S. Barkow & Beth George, Prosecuting Political Defendants, 44 GA. L. REV. 953, 975 (2010) (concluding that "the Stewart case demonstrates that, in politically charged cases, the most powerful message to the public is sent when a conviction is obtained. Prosecutors who heed this message will be cautious in their charging decisions and make sure that their allegations are based on evidence that will very likely prevail at trial. Additionally, the Stewart case demonstrates that-in terms of public perception, at least-the government's message is best sent by way of a conviction, not an indictment or the Attorney General's interaction with the media when charges are brought"); Mary Elizabeth Basile, Loyalty Testing for Attorneys: When is it Necessary and Who Should Decide?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1843 , 1883 (concluding that "[t] he case of Lynne Stewart should not engender fear that the criminal defense bar will be prevented from performing its important role in society by the looming threat of prosecution under the 'material support' provision of the USA Patriot Act because the Stewart case was a rare instance of an attorney getting too involved in her client's illegal activities. The mere fact of representing an unpopular client will not implicate a criminal defense attorney, as that would be a violation of the Sixth Amendment"); Tung Yin, Boumediene and Lawfare, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 865, 887 (2009) 
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Stewart's case represents the most direct and most publicized attack on radical lawyering. 6 What I wish to suggest in this article is that three recent developments (not including Stewart's new sentence) present-or have the potential to present-serious challenges to all stripes of cause lawyering. 7 Only one of these developments-Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 8 which was decided at the end of the 2009-10 Supreme Court term-involved designated terrorists or terrorist organizations. 9 The other case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 10 decided earlier in the 2009-10 term, struck down a provision of the McCain-Feingold Act and held that corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections could not be limited under the First Amendment.
11 The third development is a ballot initiative in Oklahoma-a measure approved by voters in the November 2010 election requiring that courts rely on federal or state law when handing down decisions and prohibiting them from using international law or Sharia law (Islamic law) when making rulings.
12 This viously not considered criminal (or sometimes even wrong) and on substantially increasing white collar penalties [is] both unfair and unlikely to be effective"). 6 See Avi Brisman, Reframing the Portrait of Lynne F. Stewart, 12 J.L. SOC'Y 1 (2011) (arguing that the impact of Stewart's case extends beyond the specifics of her representation and the defense of individuals accused of terrorism).
7 While the terms "radical lawyering" and "cause lawyering" are sometimes used interchangeably, see, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward PROF. 209, 215-16 (1998) (describing how "radical cause lawyers" endeavor to make changes in the basic structures of society and join forces with the social movements and their transformative interests and values). I conceive of "cause lawyering" rather capaciously and treat "cause lawyer" as an umbrella term that includes "radical lawyers," as well as "proceduralist" lawyers who resemble mainstream or traditional lawyers in their belief in the fundamental soundness of the legal system, and who seek to maintain law's legitimacy by providing "equal justice." See Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type. . . .: Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 657, 661, 665-73 (2004) . In my article, I deliberately employ the term "cause lawyer" so as to include both "radical lawyers" and those who consider themselves "cause lawyers" simply because they work to serve "unmet legal needs" (i.e., represent clients who cannot afford a lawyer)-the least "transgressive" of cause lawyers. The word for Islamic religious law has been transliterated into English in a number of different ways, including Sharia, Shariah, Shari'a, Sharī'ah,Sha'aria,and Sha'ria, among others. As someone who does not speak Arabic, I cannot profess to know which form is most accurate. Because the ballot title that Oklahoma voters saw on their ballot referred to Islamic law as "Sharia Law," I will use this form throughout this article. Doing so should not, in any way, be construed as support for the measure-which should be obvious based on my discussion in Part IV infra. 13 Perhaps because of the definitional challenges of "cause lawyering" and the ambiguity surrounding the term, scholars have attempted to craft "cause lawyering" typologies, spectra, and paradigms. Law professor Thomas M. Hilbink, for example, identifies a tripartite typology: "proceduralist" lawyering (which resembles mainstream or traditional lawyering, reflects a belief in the fundamental soundness of the legal system, and seeks to maintain law's legitimacy by providing "equal justice");
17 "elite/vanguard" lawyering (which treats "law as a superior form of politics" and believes that "law has the capacity to render substantive justice" and that through test-case litigation and substantive law reform one can change society);
18 and "grassroots" (which views law as "just another form of politics and is skeptical of law's utility as a tool of social change" and thus seeks to promote economic, legal, political and social transformation by working closely and in solidarity with social movements).
19
Political scientist John Kilwein introduces a "continuum of lawyering styles" that includes "individual client lawyering," "impact lawyering," "mobilization lawyering," and "client voice lawyer-(describing "cause lawyers" as attorneys who "deploy their legal skills to challenge prevailing distributions of political, social, economic, and/or legal values and resources"). 16 Scheingold & Bloom, supra note 7, at 209. See also Michalowski, supra note 14, at 523, 542 (quoting Sarat and Scheingold for the belief that cause lawyering involves " 'a self-conscious choice to give priority to causes rather than to client service,' " and noting that cause lawyering is normally understood to "take[ ] place outside of the state when attorneys deploy litigation in support of social movements seeking to pressure the state to grant some rights claim."). RESPONSIBILITIES 118, 119 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998 ) (explaining that lawyers "are expected to defend their clients in a vigorous and partisan manner while remaining neutral to their clients' objectives, activities, and identities" (emphasis added), but that " [t] he two things that distinguish the left-activist project are its fundamental challenges to the society and to the profession."). 17 See Hilbink, supra note 7, at 665-73. 18 Id. at 673-81. 19 Id. at 681-90.
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CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:289 ing." 20 The goal of "individual client lawyering," Kilwein explains, is to provide legal services to those individual clients who might otherwise be without representation. Such lawyers tend to view the basic structure of the justice system as being essentially equitable and impartial, and frequently consider their work to be the "finetuning needed to make the justice system and society operate more fairly."
21
In contrast, "impact lawyering," usually conducted through class action suits or strategically chosen individual cases, seeks to remedy conditions in society that affect a group (such as the poor) "to change policy, law, and social systems in such a way that the status of marginalized groups [i]s improved."
22 In "mobilization lawyering," the lawyer attempts to "establish a new dialogue with her or his client and demythologize the myth of legal efficacy."
23 Here, lawyers "do what they can for their clients within the existing legal structure" and "let clients know that the efficacy of traditional legal services is severely limited." 24 The goal with "mobilization lawyering" is to try to work to change "the hegemonic structure that adversely affects the poor" by giving "clients greater class consciousness, a recognition that they are part of an oppressed group in society with a history." 25 The hope is that "[c]lients would be made aware that they are part of a greater group whose members suffer similar problems as a result of the hegemonic structure of society. Ideally, similarly situated clients would develop a dialogue that would eventually lead to a unified mobilization of clients."
26 Like "mobilization lawyering," "client voice lawyering"-Kilwein's fourth category-attempts to empower the client further and eliminate the hierarchical differences in the client-lawyer relationship. But "client voice lawyering" endeavors to go further than "moblization lawyering. Political scientists Stuart Scheingold and Anne Bloom, to offer a third example, present a "transgressive continuum" (or "continuum of transgressive legal practice") with a "conventional end" and a "transgressive end."
28 They situate "cause lawyering directed toward serving unmet legal needs" (defined in terms of clients who cannot afford a lawyer) at the "conventional end" and "radical cause lawyering" (which endeavors to make changes in the basic structures of society and join forces with the social movements and their transformative interests and values) and post-structurally-inspired "critical cause lawyering" (which focuses less on large-scale transformative politics than on rejecting hierarchy at micro-sites of power, e.g., the workplace, family, community, lawyer-client relationship) at the "transgressive end." 29 In between "unmet legal needs" and "radical-critical," Scheingold and Bloom place "civil liberties" and "civil rights" lawyering (which is court-focused and seeks to protect and/or extend legal and constitutional rights) and "public policy" cause lawyering (which is conducted in legislature and administrative agencies and which blurs the law-politics distinction, advancing a policy agenda identified by the lawyer(s)).
30
Without passing judgment on these typologies-or on those not mentioned-I lean more heavily in this article on the rich continuum offered by Scheingold and Bloom to assess the impact of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, Citizens United v. Federal CHANGE 535, 546 (1987-88) ). I must confess that the distinction between "mobilization lawyering" and "client voice lawyering" is a bit difficult to discern-or, at least, Kilwein does not adequately articulate what "client voice lawyering" endeavors to achieve that "moblization lawyering" does not or cannot. But Kilwein's discussion in his section on "client voice lawyering" of the troubles lawyers encounter when representing the poor is helpful for my discussion of the potential impact of Oklahoma's "Sharia Law Amendment" in Part V infra. it a crime to provide "material support" to foreign terrorist organizations-including "expert advice or assistance," "training," "personnel," or "service"-even if such help takes the form of support for the humanitarian and political activities of the organization, legal training for peacefully resolving conflicts, and political advocacy.
31 Humanitarian Law Project (HLP)-a non-profit organization (with consultative status at the United Nations) "devoted to protecting human rights and promoting the peaceful resolution of conflict by using established international human rights law and humanitarian law" 32 -wanted to train members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to use international law to resolve disputes peacefully. 33 HLP challenged the constitutional-ity of the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which makes it a federal crime to "knowingly provid[e] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization," 34 on two grounds: 1) it "violated their freedom of speech and freedom of association under the First Amendment, because it criminalized their provision of material support to the PKK and the LTTE, without requiring the Government to prove that plaintiffs had a specific intent to further the unlawful ends of those organizations;" 35 and 2) the statute was impermissibly vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed on both grounds and expressed concerns about the fungibility of money and terrorist organizations' ability to exploit and manipulate the well-intended support of organization such as HLP: "'[m]aterial support' is a valuable resource by definition. Such support frees up other resources within the organization that may be put to violent ends. It also importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups-legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds-all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks."
36
Writing about the intersection of "attorney regulation" and free speech in the context of Humanitarian Law Project and Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., et al. v . United States-which involved a challenge to the bankruptcy regulation that prohibits lawyers from offering advice about the accumulation of additional debt in the contemplation of filing for bankruptcy 37 -Professor Renee Newman Knake asserts: [T] he Supreme Court's treatment of this federal statutory conactivities here." 130 S. Ct. at 2717. See Steven Lee Myers, A Kurdish Rebel Softens His Tone for Skeptical Ears, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011, at A8, for a report on the PKK's apparent interest in pursuing peace, rather than war. 34 Congress has amended the definition of "material support or resources" on a number of occasions, but at the time of the Court's ruling, it was defined as follows:
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization . . . that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity . . . or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006) . The authority to designate an entity a "foreign terrorist organization" rests with the Secretary of State, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1), (d)(4), and the terms "terrorist activity" and "terrorism" are defined in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) and 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2), respectively. 35 130 S. Ct. at 2714. 36 Id. at 2725. 37 130 S. Ct. 1324 Ct. (2010 .
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CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:289 straint on attorney advice may very well have significant ramifications for lawyers and clients. The results of these cases may have considerable repercussions for clients who need complete and accurate legal advice about bankruptcy or humanitarian aid efforts, and for their attorneys who are under ethical obligations to deliver that information. The Supreme Court's ruling in these cases also may adversely impact the ability of attorneys to offer advice in other areas of law, for an affirmation of these statutory restrictions on legal advice potentially emboldens Congress to impose similar restraints in other areas of law.
38
For Knake, an attorney's ability to deliver factual, full, and frank legal guidance is integral to the attorney-client relationship, and the cases of Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project, she argues, will have "considerable repercussions for clients who need complete and accurate legal advice about bankruptcy or humanitarian aid efforts, and for their attorneys who are under ethical obligations to deliver that information." 39 While Knake is worried about the impact of these cases on clients specifically seeking guidance about bankruptcy or peace-making activities-and about how attorneys should negotiate these limits on the delivery of legal advice with their established ethical duties-she has a larger concern: Congressional involvement in the attorney-client relationship. 40 According to Knake, the First Amendment rights of lawyers and clients are under attack and the decisions in Milavetz and Humanitarian Law Project may embolden Congress to "legislate away the lawyer's ability to advise her client" in other areas of the law.
41
Knake's comments illuminate the impact that Humanitarian Law Project may have on "individual client lawyering" (to use Kilwein's category) or "cause lawyering directed toward serving unmet legal needs" (to use Scheingold and Bloom's). But because the case essentially criminalizes individual, organizational, and nonstate-sponsored peacemaking by prohibiting lawyers from working with designated foreign terrorist organizations to bring about peace, it may affect more "transgressive" lawyers who often share some of the interests, values, and perspectives of their clients. 42 As noted above, "radical cause lawyering" endeavors to make changes 38 Knake, supra note 31, at 1516. 39 Renee Newman Knake, Contemplating Free Speech and Congressional Efforts to Constrain Legal Advice, 37 RUTGERS L. REC. 12, 19 (2010) . 19 . 41 Id. at 16-17. 42 The extent to which the lawyer shares her client's goals, as well as the means and methods for achieving them, can prove problematic for the lawyer and client. See Brisman, supra note 6.
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in the basic structures of society, and radical cause lawyers often join forces with the social movements and their transformative interests and values. 43 Just as I have explained elsewhere, 44 I do not intend to suggest here that lawyers who join designated "foreign terrorist organizations" or who engage in "terrorist activities" or who counsel their clients to participate in "terrorism" (however defined) 45 should avoid the repercussions of their decisions and actions. But the decision in Humanitarian Law Project may discourage some cause lawyers who (had) hope(d) to use international human rights law to bring about social and political change because the case effectively turns would-be peacemakers into criminals and places the ability to resolve conflicts peacefully solely in the hands of the federal government and its approved-of agents. Thus, to some extent, Humanitarian Law Project is really a case about the scope of State power-a case that essentially shows a lack of faith in individuals and groups (to resolve conflicts), and a belief that peaceful resolution to disputes must be according to/within Statedefined parameters. 46 REV. 1399 REV. , 1424 REV. (2003 (concluding that "a bar applicant who belongs to a terrorist cell or who claims to support terrorist activities would most likely be rejected based on the rule of [Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) ], a bar applicant who supports a terrorist's criticisms of the U.S. government, but not the violent means, should not be denied admission."). 45 For a discussion of the moniker "terrorism," and the confusion generated by the terms "eco-terrorism," which is often used by governmental officials and corporate officers to refer to actions taken in the name of the Earth and for the sake of environmental protection-actions more appropriately labeled "ecodefense," "ecotage," or "monkeywrenching"-and "environmental terrorism," the name frequently given to acts that use the environment as a tool for indiscriminate violence or threatened violence to large numbers of innocent civilians for the purpose of causing disruption, panic, harm and death (such as tampering with a food or water supply or the release of nuclear material or biological weapons), see Avi Brisman, Crime-Environment Relationships and Environmental Justice, 6 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 727, 754-60 (2008) . 46 53 Although an in-depth discussion of Citizens United is outside the scope of this article, I will use this occasion to note that I agree with Justice Stephen Breyer who, in speaking more generally about government regulation of certain activities affecting speech (e.g., campaign finance, corporate advertising about matters of public concern, and drugstore advertising that informs the public about the availability of custom-made pharmaceuticals), has written that the First Amendment should be read "not in isolation but as seeking to maintain a system of free expression designed to further a basic constitutional purpose: creating and maintaining democratic decisionmaking institutions. Lawyers can seek to configure districts and voting algorithms to maximize the power of subordinated people and organize the timing and process of elections to increase turnout. They can facilitate participation by new political parties and seek term limits to reduce the advantages of incumbency. Most important, if also most difficult, they can restrain the translation of economic power into political dominance, devising rules limiting campaign contributions, equalizing media access, and prohibiting political activity by government employees . . . .
62
Cause lawyers still play a role in districting and eligibility to vote.
63
But Citizens United, which gave corporations the unlimited right to spend money on political candidates, further affirms the correlation between economic power and political dominance. In other words, by holding that corporations have the same free speech rights as individuals, the Court in Citizens United further skewed the already differential ability to participate in and influence the polity. 64 Because Citizens United affects cause lawyers' role with respect to issues concerning limits to campaign contributions and media access, cause lawyers may have to rethink how they use law to structure the competition of political power-if they do at all.
To a large extent, the type of cause lawyering that Abel discusses in his section on the electoral process falls under Scheingold and Bloom's category of "public policy cause lawyering," which (2007) (discussing the impact of criminal disenfranchisement on national, state and local elections, as well as its effect on both felons' and ex-felons' home communities and the communities where convicted offenders are incarcerated, arguing for a consideration of criminal disenfranchisement as an "environmental" issue, and suggesting a series of reforms to state criminal disenfranchisement laws and policies). 64 See generally Noah Feldman, What a Liberal Court Should Be, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, Magazine at 38, 42 (describing the "antidistortion value"-"the concern that corporations will have a disproportionate effect on elections by providing more money than individuals can.").
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NEW CHALLENGES TO CAUSE LAWYERING 305 they situate between "unmet legal needs" and "radical-critical" in their "continuum of transgressive legal practice." 65 According to Scheingold and Bloom, Public policy cause lawyering is professionally transgressive, in part, just because it is less likely to be conducted in the courts than in legislatures and administrative agencies. In addition, its objective is to advance a policy agenda identified by the cause lawyers, themselves, as in the public interest. Thus, public policy cause lawyering is neither about remedying individual grievances nor even about asserting rights. All of this further attenuates the lawyer-client relationship while at the same time flaunting the profession's carefully cultivated image of political neutrality.
Whether public policy cause lawyering is politically transgressive depends . . . on how sweeping its aspirations are and on whether it goes through, or attempts to bypass, "normal" politics . . . Typically, however, public policy cause lawyering is more cautious and may well be less politically transgressive than civil rights and civil liberties cause lawyering. This is because a decision to pursue discrete policy goals in the political arena entails reliance on lobbying of legislative, executive and regulatory agencies. Insofar as public policy cause lawyers, thus, decide to play the insiders' game, they must play it by the insiders' rules-privileging immediate substantive outcomes and the bargaining necessary to achieve them. In contrast, civil rights and civil liberties lawyers tend to turn to the courts because the other institutions of the state have been unresponsive to their claims.
66
In the aftermath of Citizens United, some cause lawyers may find themselves (once-and-for-all) fed up with efforts at "the conventional end of the continuum"-i.e., trying to reform, rather than transform the system. 67 "Lawyering at this end of the continuum is . . . about deploying legal practice to get the state, the society and the profession to live up to their established ideals," 68 Scheingold and Bloom explain, and some cause lawyers may lose hope (if they have not already) in this possibility after Citizens United.
But other cause lawyers may feel that Citizens United simply forces them to reorient how they conduct "public policy cause lawyering"-how they use law to structure the competition of/for political power (in the electoral process), not whether they do so. For
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[Vol. 14:289 example, with the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United, corporations may spend freely in candidate elections; issues regarding the federal law that limits "soft money" donations to political parties remain, however, and in November 2010, the Supreme Court declined to hear a campaign finance case that would have allowed it to clarify aspects of its Citizens United ruling regarding "registration and disclosure requirements that apply to political action committees." 69 Given the rate with which the Roberts Court has ruled for business interests, 70 cause lawyers may find, then, that Citizens United has simply forced them to dig in their heels, rather than abandon ship.
To offer another example, Public Citizen-the national, nonprofit consumer advocacy organization-examined disclosure forms filed with the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to determine which groups paid for "electioneering activities" during the 2010 mid-term elections, who funded those groups, and which candidates were supported or attacked by these outside groups. 71 The organization determined that outside groups' contributions "were hidden and concentrated, and that the independent groups pushed their support to conservative candidates." 72 According to Public Citizen, ten groups out of at least 149 independent organizations spending money to influence the midterm elections were responsible for 65% of the $176.1 million expended by the end of . "Electioneering activities" include "electioneering communication" (an advertisement broadcast before an election that "mentions a federal candidate but stops short of advocating a vote for or against the candidate") and "independent expenditures," which "expressly advocate for the victory or defeat of a candidate." Taylor 
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October 2010-and that corporate money favored Republican candidates by a margin of 10-to-1. 73 Given this imbalance, cause lawyers might work to investigate whether various groups have the goal of influencing elections as their primary purpose. If such groups are registered as 501(c)(4) organizations, they would be in violation of tax laws, which preclude such organizations from having political campaign activity as their primary purpose.
74 "Public policy cause lawyers" might also seek the passage of the DISCLOSE Act (which purportedly would enhance disclosers and disclaimers, as well as prevent foreign entities from influencing the outcome of U.S. elections), 75 work for the approval of the Shareholder Protection Act, which would mandate shareholder authorization before a public company may make certain political expenditures, 76 or push for the passage of the Fair Elections Now Act-a bill that would create a public financing system for congressional elections, thereby limiting the influence of big money campaign donations and encouraging candidates with limited resources to run for office, 77 among other measures. 78 Ultimately, the personal motivations of the individual lawyer may determine whether the Court's opinion in Citizens United permitting unlimited corporate spending in federal elections is interpreted as a sign of the limitations of liberal legalism (and thus, perhaps, a need for more radical lawyering) or is regarded as creating new possibilities for using law to curb the influence of economic resources on political power.
V. THE OKLAHOMA "SHARIA LAW AMENDMENT" AND THE VIOLENCE OF INTERPRETATION
The Oklahoma International Law Amendment (also known as the Oklahoma "Sharia Law Amendment" and the Oklahoma "Save Our State" Amendment 79 )-a legislatively-referred constitutional 73 Id. at 6. 74 Under the federal tax code, 501(c)(4) organizations, unlike 501(c)(3) organizations, are not limited in the amount of time or money they can devote to lobbying, and may participate in political campaigns and elections, as long as campaigning is not the organization's primary purpose. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), (4) 85 Because this Article is concerned with the potential impacts of various legal developments on cause lawyering, rather than the strengths and weaknesses of the legal [Vol. 14:289 some might contend that the Amendment, even if it were to become law, would have little impact on decision-making or lawyering. 86 But I would suggest that regardless of the outcome, cause lawyers should take notice. And if the Amendment does become law-if judges are not permitted to consider international law or Sharia law (however infrequently this may occur)-then one potential outcome is that criminal defense lawyers will likely not make such arguments in court, thereby curtailing their ability to creatively defend their clients, and lawyers in civil suits may be limited (or feel limited) in their pursuit of or discouraged from finding "creative solutions to problems so [as to] minimize contentious argument and satisfy more party needs." 87 and public policy arguments of different positions, I will not analyze the merits of the different parties' arguments, the reasoning behind Judge Miles-Lagrange's order, or speculate on the outcome of the case. 86 It bears mention that although Oklahoma has very few Muslims-only 30,000 out of a population of 3.7 million-some fear that the Amendment, if it becomes law, could discourage foreign companies from doing business in the state if they believe international agreements will not be honored in court. See Eberle, supra note 12.
87 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 25 (1996) . Menkel-Meadow's full statement is as follows: "expanding the stories, the interests, the issues, and the stakes actually enhances the likelihood of making 'trades' and finding other creative solutions to problems so that we can minimize contentious argument and satisfy more party needs." Although Menkel-Meadow is not discussing Sharia law, I am suggesting here that when judges are permitted to consider more types of law, lawyers can tell better stories, which can result in better client defense and more creative problem-solving/ dispute resolution. Conversely, when lawyers are limited in the substance or language of their legal discourse, then their legal power is diminished-and often greatly so. See Sally Engle Merry, Resistance and the Cultural Power of Law, 29 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 11, 14 (1995) (explaining that "[c] ourts . . . provide performances in which problems are named and solutions determined. These performances include conversations in which the terms of the argument are established and penalties determined. The ability to structure this talk and to determine the relevant discourse within which an issue is framed in other words, in which the reigning account of events is established is an important facet of the power exercised by law, as carefully described by recent studies of legal discourse."). See generally JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE, AND POWER 14 (1998) (concluding that "language is not merely the vehicle through which legal power operates: in many vital respects, language is legal power. The abstraction we call power is at once the cause and the effect of countless linguistic interactions taking place every day at every level of the legal system. Power is thus determinative of and determined by the linguistic details of legal practice . . . ."); Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 814, 827 (1987) (explaining that "the interpretation of law is never simply the solitary act of a judge concerned with providing a legal foundation for a decision which, at least in its origin, is unconnected to law and reason. . . . The practical content of the law which emerges in the judgment is the product of a symbolic struggle between professionals possessing unequal technical skills and social influence. They thus have unequal ability to marshal the available juridical resources through the exploration of exploitation of 'possible rules,' and to use them effectively, as symbolic weapons, to win their case. The juridical effect of the rule-its real meaning-can be discovered in Restrictions on the use of international law and Sharia law also run the risk of a certain kind of violence-interpretive violence. 88 As the specific power relation between professionals. Assuming that the abstract equity of the contrary positions they represent is the same, this power relation might be thought of as corresponding to the power relations between the parties in the case."). For more in-depth analysis of the ways in which legal discourse in various legal forums (e.g., courts, law offices, mediation centers) affect and define identities and relationships among and between various legal "players" (including clients, litigants, defendants, and others "using" the law), see, e. Theirs is the jurispathic office. Confronting the luxuriant growth of a hundred legal traditions, they assert that this one is law and destroy or try to destroy the rest."); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95(8) YALE L.J. 1601, 1615 (1986) ("When judges interpret, they trigger agentic behavior within just such an institution or social organization. On one level judges may appear to be, and may in fact be, offering their understanding of the normative world to their intended audience. But on another level they are engaging a violent mechanism through which a substantial part of their audience loses its capacity to think and act autonomously.").
Note that according to one Cover scholar, Cover "distinguished between the word or 'interpretation,' with its suggestion of 'social construction of an interpersonal reality through language,' and 'violence,' as 'pain and death,' with its language-and 'world-destroying' capacity." Marianne Constable, The Silence of the Law: Justice in Cover's "Field of Pain and Death," in LAW, VIOLENCE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 49, 83 (Austin Sarat ed., 2001 ). This does not mean that Constable believes that Cover did not find violence in legal interpretation. Indeed, Cover begins Violence and the Word by asserting:
Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death. This is true in several senses. Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the imposition of violence upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life. Interpretations in law also constitute justifications for violence which has already occurred or which is about to occur. When interpreters have finished their work, they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn apart by these organized, social practices of violence. Neither legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions may be properly understood apart from one another. This much is obvious, though the growing literature that argues for the centrality of interpretive practices in law blithely ignores it.
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Kim Lane Scheppele describes in Narrative Resistance and the Struggle for Stories:
We (those who subscribe to American law as a set of practices) need cases; we thrive on facts. With facts, we make stories, and we worry about the application of rules to the stories we make . . . We can no more do law without stories than we can fly without mechanical devices. Stories are already always everywhere in American legal scholarship, no matter how doctrinal the scholarship is. To a civilian lawyer, Americans appear obsessed with stories."
89
Similarly, Dragan Milovanovic explains that "[l]awyers construct stories. Stories are organizational devices for presenting believable (plausible) chains of events," 90 and George P. Lopez describes how "[l]aw is not a collection of definitions and mandates to be memorized and applied but a culture composed of storytellers, audiences, remedial ceremonies, a set of standard stories and arguments, and a variety of conventions about storywriting, storytelling, argument making, and the structure and content of legal COVER, Violence and the Word, supra at 1601. What I believe Constable is suggesting here is that Cover differentiated between legal interpretations that lead to or bring about violence and the violent acts themselves-"interpretations which occasion violence are distinct from the violent acts they occasion." Id. at 1613. In other words, Cover sought first to distinguish the "physical pain" or pain "in the flesh" from the interpretive act that propagate or otherwise order or result in violence, and second, to distinguish between judicial interpretation that leads to "real" or "actual" violence and the "figurative" or "literary" violence that "strong poets do to their literary ancestorS." Id. at 1609 n.20. See also Peter Fitzpatrick, Why the Law is also Nonviolent, in LAW, VIOLENCE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 49, 147 (Austin Sarat ed., 2001). Cover's goal was simultaneously to call attention to the way in which law (via legal interpretation) is violent without diminishing the actual pain one experiences when one loses one's freedom, property, children, or life as a result of a judicial decree.
89 Kim Lane Scheppele, Narrative Resistance and the Struggle for Stories, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 83, 83-84 (1996) . See also JAMES M. DONOVAN, LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION xviii (2008) (stating that "[m]uch of law concerns . . . telling of stories"). See generally Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra n.88 at 4-5 ("We inhabit a nomos-a normative universe. We constantly create and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void. The student of law may come to identify the normative world with the professional paraphernalia of social control. The rules and principles of justice, the formal institutions of the law, and the conventions of a social order are, indeed, important to that world; they are, however, but a small part of the normative universe that ought to claim our attention. No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live."). R. 387 (1990-91) . See generally Pierre Bourdieu, supra note 87, at 834 (explaining that " [t] hose who tacitly abandon the direction of their conflict themselves by accepting entry into the juridical field (giving up, for example, the resort to force, or to an unofficial arbitrator, or the direct effort to find an amicable solution) are reduced to the status of client. The field transforms their prejuridical interests into legal cases and transforms into social capital the professional qualifications that guarantees the mastery of the juridical resources required by the field's own logic." (emphasis added)).
93 Kilwein, supra note 20, at 186 (citing Austin Sarat, ". . . The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990) ); White, Paradox, Piece-Work and Patience, supra note 92. See generally Bourdieu, supra note 87, at 831-32 ("Entry into the juridical field implies the tacit acceptance of the field's fundamental law, an essential tautology which requires that, within the field, conflicts can only be resolved juridically-that is, according to the rules and conventions of the field itself. For this reason, such entry completely redefines ordinary experience and the whole situation at stake in any litigation. As is true of any 'field,' the constitution of the juridical field is a principle of constitution of reality itself. To join the game, to agree to play the game, to accept the law for the resolution of the conflict, is tacitly to adopt a mode of expression and discussion implying the renunciation of physical violence and of elementary forms of symbolic violence, such as insults. It is above all to recognize the specific requirements of the juridical construction of the issue. Since juridical facts are the products of juridical construction, and not vice versa, a complete retranslation of all of the aspects of the controversy is necessary in order . . . to institute the controversy as a lawsuit, as a juridical problem that can become the object of jurisdically regulated debate. Such a retranslation retains as part of the case everything that can be argued from the point of view of legal 314
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[Vol. 14:289 strictions on a judge's use of international law or Sharia law (which raise their own questions regarding "judicial independence" 94 ) may not only limit a lawyer's right and privilege to define her approach as a lawyer to defend her client in criminal cases, 95 but might infringe on her representation in the sense of "storytelling"-in the sense of presenting and depicting different points of view, values, opportunities, tragedies, and social pathologies in both criminal and civil cases alike.
96 Indeed, for many clients, feeling as if one's story has been told may-and often is-ultimately more important than the outcome of the case. 97 pertinence, and only that; only whatever can stand as a fact or as a favorable or unfavorable argument remains."). 94 JUSTICE 3, 8 (Austin Sarat, ed., 2001 ) (discussing how the law can be violent "in the ways it uses languages and in its representational practices, in the silencing of perspectives and the denial of experience, and in its objectifying epistemology" (internal footnotes omitted)). Menkel-Meadow claims that "different people will interpret the same 'fact' in different ways," and, thus, that "if 'truth' is to be arrived at, it is best done through multiple stories and deliberations." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 87, at 8, 20. In this article, I stop short of discussing whether "truth"-either "absolute truths" or "particular truths"-can be arrived at and, if so, whether it is best accomplished through multiple stories and deliberations . See Joan Chalmers Williams, Culture and Certainty: Legal History and the Reconstructive Project, 76 VA. L. REV. 713 (1990) . Instead, I contend, as I have elsewhere, that opening the avenues for more stories to be told and increasing the ways in which (those) stories are told produces not just "edifying conversation," but "strategies through which a population, inevitably divided by differences over a very broad range of affairs, can seek a series of . . . (Mar. 19, 2010) . 97 See e.g., PETER JUST, DOU DONGGO JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND MORALITY IN AN INDO-NESIAN SOCIETY 15 (2000) (asserting that litigants seeking justice are at least as interested in having audiences to whom they can tell their stories, in whom they can rouse the sense of pity and awareness, outrage and indignation, terror and grief that has brought them to whatever pass they have been brought to achieve whatever therapeu-
2011]
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In Alternative Juridico-Semiotic Forms, 20 LEGAL STUD. F. 295, 297-98 (1996) (stating that "success in criminal law [practice] is an exercise in constructive narratives that have plausibility in the eyes of criminal justice practitioners and the jurors. Accordingly, segments of the population that are disenfranchised find themselves more at risk in the use of dominant symbolizations and constructions, whereas higher income individuals remain 'beyond incrimination.' "); Michael D. Reisig, Procedural Justice and Community Policing Programs: What Shapes Residents' Willingness to Participate in Crime Prevention Programs?, 1(3) POLICING 356, 356-69 (2007) ; Sarre, supra note 47, at 12 (explaining that "cultural and gender issues are . . . officially irrelevant to adversarial criminal proceedings, although they may, in fact, be crucial to the etiology of the incident in the first place and crucial to the outcome. Thus, at the end of the day, many parties tend to leave the modern criminal justice system experience embittered, burdened with costs and often determined to seek further action, judicial and extrajudicial, if at all possible. This is a common experience amongst many victims, offenders and their families alike."); Jason Sunshine and Tom R. REV. 2695 REV. (2006 . While a comprehensive analysis is well-outside the scope of this Article, I will briefly note that my position is akin to that of the Israeli jurisprudent, Aharon Barak, who has lamented the hesitancy of U.S. judges to contemplate foreign law, as well as that of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who has defended the use of foreign law by American judges. Barak states: "Regrettably, the United States Supreme Court makes very little use of comparative law . . . [M] ost Justices of the United States Supreme Court do not cite foreign case law in their judgments. They fail to make use of an important source of inspiration, one that enriches legal thinking, makes law more creative, and strengthens the democratic ties and foundations of different legal systems . . . American law in general, and its constitutional law in particular, is rich and developed. American law is comprised of not one but fifty-one legal systems. Nonetheless, I think that it is always possible to learn new things even from other democratic legal systems that, in their turn, have learned from American law." Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. Rev. 16, 114 (2001) . Similarly, Justice Ginsburg has asked, " 'Why shouldn't we look to the wisdom of a judge from abroad with at least as much ease as we should read a law review article written by a professor?' " (quoted in Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on Her Court, and Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A14 US, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 7, 2010 , available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39564255/ns/politics-decision_2010/t/ angle-muslim-law-taking-hold-parts-us/#.Tl0ZPzuk9aU ("My thoughts are these, first of all, Dearborn, Michigan, and Frankford, Texas are on American soil, and under constitutional law. Not Sharia law. And I don't know how that happened in the United States. It seems to me there is something fundamentally wrong with allowing a foreign system of law to even take hold in any municipality or government situation in our United States" (quoting U.S. Senate candidate Sharron Angle (R-Nev.)), with Eliyahu Stern, Don't Fear Islamic Law in America, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2011 ("Shariah is a mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States and in the world as we know it" (quoting Republican presidential candidate New Gingrich)). Justice Scalia's comment strikes me as short-sighted, Angle's and Gingrich's as xenophobic and inaccurate.
102 See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, Stricter Brand of Islam Spreads Across Indonesian Penal Code, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2009, at A6 . Similarly, Sarre notes that there are instances "where customary law may offend other human rights and the laws based upon those rights." Sarre, supra note 47, at 99. Thus, a call for greater flexibility for judges to consult international law or Sharia law (or customary law practices, in the case of Sarre) should not be interpreted as endorsement of all of the substance and features of those legal regimes.
What does this mean for cause lawyers? Should the measure eventually become law, it has the potential to affect the nature of representation for even the most conventional cause lawyers in Oklahoma-those who engage in "cause lawyering directed toward serving unmet legal needs" (or "proceduralist lawyering"). As articulated above, such lawyers will have at their disposal fewer tools to creatively defend their clients, seek solutions to civil suits, and provide their clients with a sense of procedural justice. Outside of Oklahoma, groups and organizations espousing hateful "Save Our State" views may feel emboldened by the developments in Oklahoma and may try to follow suit, pushing for similar types of measures in their states.
111 Civil rights and civil liberties cause lawsome lawyers involved in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) (still) approach ADR with an "adversarial" mindset. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 87, at note 97 and accompanying text. 111 Recently, legislative leaders in at least half a dozen states, including Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina, have indicated that they will propose bills similar to the controversial Arizona law, adopted in the spring of 2010, authorizing state and local police to inquire about the immigration status of anyone they detained for other reasons if they had "reasonable suspicion" that the person was an illegal immigrant. Although a federal court has suspended central provisions of the Arizona statute, legislative leaders appear undeterred; some have also announced measures to crack down on illegal immigration by canceling automatic U.S. citizenship for children born in this country to illegal immigrant parents, as well as legislation to punish employers who hire illegal immigrants and measures to limit access to public colleges and other benefits to illegal immigrants. Julia Preston, Political Battle on Immigration Shifts to States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011, at A1, A11. This willingness to follow Arizona's lead despite the federal court stay suggests that the anti-immigration current may be sufficiently strong as to inspire initiatives
